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It was a fearsome spectacle of violent determination, of pikes and flashing 
scimitars, of muskets, bows and arrows, of howling men, thousands 
of them, in coloUlful turbans waving banners and invoking divine 
assistance in their imminent jihad, and of Janissaries,' the Ottoman 
Empire's elite and most disciplined standing force of infantrymen, 
indeed its armour of self-confidence. The formidable Ottoman armada,2 
under the command of Piille Pasha, with Mustafa Pasha as general of 
the land forces, to be joined later by Dragut's corsair fleet and that of 
Hasan Pasha of Algiers, arrived at the shores of Hospitaller Malta on 18 
May 1565. The next day, some 23-25,000 Turks disembarked. To resist 
them were 500 Hospitallers and some 8,000 men. 
Ten painfully long days later, the siege of the small fort of St Elmo 
had begun, marking the first phase of this epic drama. St Elmo fell on 
23 June, ironically on the eve of the feast of St John the Baptist, the 
Hospital's patron saint. The next Ottoman targets were Fort St Michael 
on Senglea and the bastion defended by the langue of Castile in Birgu. 
It seemed only a matter of time before the central Mediterranean island, 
small, weak, and barren, would fall once more in Muslim hands, and its 
governing body, the military-religious Order of St John, now under the 
leadership of Jean de la Valette, would be permanently relegated to a 
fossilised past. In the last thirty years the Ottomans had twice emerged 
triumphant over the Hospitallers - at Rhodes in 15223 and at Maghribi 
Tripoli in 1551.4 Malta would be the third occasion. Four months later, in 
the second week of September, however, that same mighty armada and 
what had remained of its men, horses, and war materiel retreated from 
the island's shores and, with all their hopes frustrated, sailed back home 
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- in haste, as the autumn storms in the Mediterranean were approaching, 
and in shame, as the resistance the small, accessible, vulnerable island 
offered them was a hideous blow to Ottoman pride and prestige. 
The great Spanish relief force under Don Garcia de Toledo had 
arrived on 7 September,s signalling the lifting of the siege. By then 
'both besiegers and besieged had in fact reached the same pitch of 
exhaustion'.6 This time the Turks failed to achieve their ultimate goal -
to take Malta and destroy the chivalric institution of 'corsairs parading 
crossesO? that for centuries had been harassing their men, women, and 
children, sacking their villages, blatantly interrupting their trade and 
commerce, interfering with their supplies, and inflicting heavy losses 
on their shipping. They left behind a tragic sight, whose realism would 
have stung Stendhal's acute psychological finesse into immediate 
action - a ravaged countryside, a putrid stench of death with rotting 
corpses littering the whole place, a trail of smoke, dust, and widespread 
devastation, and crowds of people, most of them badly wounded, 
chanting the Te Deum solemnly amid scenes of horror, sorrow, and 
jubilation at the conventual church of St Lawrence in the tiny coastal 
city of Birgu. 'Never,' confessed Francisco Balbi di Correggio in 
his diary, 'did music sound so sweet to human ears as did the peals 
of our bells on this day.'8 With Spain's naval forces and the Order's 
three well-armed galleys around,9 it is curious why the Turkish armada 
was allowed to sail out of Marsarnxetto harbour unchallenged. If it is 
correct to assume that Don Garcia had had instructions not to engage 
the enemy, but simply to relieve the Hospitaller island 'by a show of 
force' ,10 then why did he set off for the Levant, in mid-September, 'in 
the hope of capturing at least some of the Turkish round ships in the rear 
of the [retreating] armada' 11? 
Basing himself on Spanish and Italian primary sources and other 
secondary literature, Femand Braudel points out that 'alarming reports' 
had been spreading from as early as January 1565.12 Indeed. A cursory 
survey of Codex 91 of the Libri Conciliorum, the records of the Order's 
Ordinary Council meetings kept at the National Library of Malta in 
Valletta, confirms that for the knights, the siege could not have been too 
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much of a surprise. The relevant minutes of the Council meetings are 
being reproduced in table-form below. 
1565 
The Hospital's Ordinary Council Minutes 
recording the 'alarming reports' 
of 1565 and related matters 
19 January Soldiers recruited in Naples and Sicily to serve in Malta; other 
defence measures taken for an eventual Turkish assault. 
AOM,* cod. 91,fo1.l43v; Bosio,* W, 496. 
7Febiuary . Chapter-general postponed (prorogata est) t()18February.Three 
days later postponed again to first Sunday in May because of 
current rumours of a Turkish invasion. 
AOM, cod. 91, col. 144; Bosio, 49S. 
lO February A general tax of 30,000 gold scudi imposed on all priories to 
finance further defence measures. 
AOM, cod. 91, col. 144; Bosio, 49S. 
23 March Reports of a very likely assault reach Council. 
AOM, cod. 91, co1.l48; Bosio, W, 498. 
10 April Council seeks detailed information as to the exact number and 
quality of servants in the employ of the Hospitallers; 
Council orders all servants who could not bear arms, and all 
Maltese and foreign donne di malaffare to leave for Sicily. 
AOM, cod. 91, col.lS0; Bosio, W, SOl. 
17 April Council decrees that a roll-call should be made of all knights and 
servants-at-arms residing at the auberges, and that these should 
examine carefully the state of their arms, etc, both defensive and 
offensive. 
AOM, cod. 91, col.lS1; Bosio, W, S04. 
30 April Chapter-general again postponed to the first Sunday in July. 
AOM, cod.91, col.1S1v. 
4 May Measures taken for a better defence of Gozo. 
AOM, cod. 91, col.lS2; Bosio, W, S03-S04. 
9 May A four-man commission assigned the task of seeing that all 
provisions of wheat, barley, and vegetables were collected and 
taken to Birgu. 
AOM, cod. 91, col.lS2; Bosio, W, S10. 
[* AOM: Archives of the Order of Malta, 
National Library of Malta, Valletta 
Bosio: Iacomo Bosio, Dell'lstoria della Sacra Religione et lll.ma Militia di San 
Giovallni Gierosolimitallo. Parte 111. (Rome, 1602)] 
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If Balbi di Correggio's account of the episode is anything to go by, 
it was Silleyman's 'dearest wish to capture Malta'.u Not that the 
island itself was of any great importance to the Empire,14 but it 'lay,' 
observes Jacques Heers, 'in the path of every Turkish raid or campaign 
westwards, and every time the Turks sallied forth, or returned East, they 
came across the Knights and their guns and ships' . 15 
Balbi di Correggio's diary is a first-hand account of what the sixty-
year-old Spanish arquebusier had personally witnessed during the 
siege. He identifies two reasons motivating Suleyman's attempt. Once 
Malta was in Ottoman hands, he quotes the sultan as saying, 'other 
more large-scale enterprises' would follow in an endeavour to realise 
what Silleyman's father had failed to accomplish - the conquest of 
Calabria; in 1480 the city-port of Otranto had already been taken (but 
then lost the following year).16 The sequence of events subsequent 
to 1565 raises important questions, prompting me to challenge the 
authenticity of Balbi di Correggio's claim - even if only to invite 
historians of early modern times to rethink the narrative about these 
years. In 1574, the Ottomans took Tunis permanently, which lies nearer 
Sicily than Malta does. How many attempts did the Ottomans make to 
realise their objective, to seize Sicily and the whole of Latin Europe 
from their comfortable base in Tunis after that date? None that I know 
of. Why? Was there a change of heart? Did they start having second 
thoughts about the sanity of Silleyman's project? Were the 'strategic 
narrows' between Tunis and Sicily fraught with greater perils now than 
those between Hospitaller Malta and Sicily had been before 1565? Was 
it because of Malta's ever-present naval forces in the area;which tends 
to reconfirm the Order of the Hospital's unfailing political relevance 
to Europe? Lepanto, the much celebrated but meaningless Christian 
victory, could not have been that determining to change the course of 
Mediterranean history. The decisive factor, as Fernand Braudel points 
out, was the truce between the two major powers of the day which 
rendered the return of peace in the Mediterranean possible and marked 
the beginning of the 'naval decline' of the Ottoman empire. But that 
was concluded in 1581,17 
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There was a second reason, perhaps a more significant one as it had 
taken precedence in the diarist's thinking. Earlier in his account, Balbi 
di Correggio had underscored the sultan's increasing hatred and fury 
against the Order of St JohnlS for the great and irreparable damage 
their piratical adventures in the Levant were causing the Empire. I am 
inclined to believe this to have been the sultan's true driving force. 
Lionel Butler once claimed that 'it is open to doubt whether they 
wished to acquire Malta, which they regarded as poor, unhealthy, and 
exposed' .19 Whether Siileyman would have besieged Malta had not the 
knights been settled there is a moot point, certainly not an exercise in 
historical retrospection. 
It is still not sufficiently clear why the powerful military machine of the 
Ottoman Empire had to wait so long to strike. The Ottoman triumph at 
Djerba in 1560 was a significant event;20 but, like the Habsburg siege 
of Tunis in 1535 ('Charles V's greatest victory against Islam'21) and 
the battle of Lepanto in 1571, it was one without a morrow. In 1560, 
or perhaps the year after, the Ottomans appear to have missed a golden 
opportunity. The Habsburg expedition had ended up in a complete 
disaster, with half the armada sunk and some 600 of 'Spain's best men' 
lost.22 The following year, Dragut destroyed seven more Spanish galleys, 
while in 1562, a storm wrecked what was left of that mighty armada, 
some 25 more galleys, off Malaga.23 That would have been the right 
moment to strike at Malta when the Habsburgs could not have afforded 
to send any relief force to the Hospitaller island. With Tripoli in Ottoman 
hands, and Algiers, Bougie, and almost the rest of the Maghribi coast 
under the control of Siileyman's corsair-vassals, 'the Turks,' says Andre 
Clot, 'were masters ofthe sea'.2-+ DavidAbulafia claims, and rightly so, 
that the victory at Djerba 'boosted the confidence of the Turks. They 
had good reason to feel that they were on the verge of a breakthrough. '25 
Molly Greene makes a similar remark: 'The Ottomans were now firmly 
in control of the central Mediterranean' .26 
The three remarks offer a plausibly realistic assessment of the situation, 
but it is not followed up by the pertinent question of why the Ottomans 
did not act then? Why did the Turks fail to exploit Spain's obvious 
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weakness? This seeming strategic error on the part of the Ottomans may 
explain their retreat empty-handed in September 1565. But appearances 
in the past could have been as deceptive as they can be today. There were 
forces at work which appear to have defied the cold logic of geo-politics 
and geo-strategic thinking. These may go far to convince historians that 
the opportunity the immediate Djerba aftermath had offered was not 
altogether inexplicably missed. It is one of the historian's tasks to offer 
explanations, to say why this or that event happened. But the reasons 
put forward, however plausible they may sound, may not necessarily be 
the real ones. 
Interpretations may sound valid and convincing, and at the same time, 
as in the present case, be miles away from what had really motivated 
inaction. Some historians talk of the sultan's contemporary war against 
the Persians on his eastern frontier. A spirit of uncertainty, insecurity, 
and rebellion pervaded the empire. After the execution of Prince 
Mustafa in 1553, the prevailing 'fratricidal strife' between his two 
surviving sons, Bajazid, who had fled to Iran in 1559,27 and Selim,28 
was a major preoccupation. With the Janissaries taking sides, more 
inclined to offer their support to the former, their loyalty to the sultan 
was put in doubt. The peace treaty of Cateau-Cambresis (April 1558), 
which ended the 65-year struggle (1494-1559) between Spain and 
France for control of Italy, deprived the Ottomans of access to the safe 
and convenient base at the French port of Toulon, from where they 
could organise devastating activities against the Spain of Philip n, her 
trade, and dependencies.29 There was, moreover, a raging famine and 
a plague epidemic, both of which could have disrupted-the military 
programme. These conditions may have dictated Ottoman inaction in 
Western waters, indeed 'paralysing' Stileyman' s movements and his 
ability to decide.30 John Wolffurther explains that without the sultan's 
physical presence at the theatre of war in the Western Mediterranean, 
his forces were 'immobilised' .31 But would not the Turkish fleet under 
PHile Pasha at Djerba weaken this claim? And what about the siege of 
Malta itself? Other than the Hospitallers, the Ottomans in 1560 had no 
one else to fear. 
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The knight Romegas, 'the most notorious' Hospitaller-pirate,32 and 
'the only Christian buccaneer to rival Dragut and Barbarossa in 
piratical panache' - perhaps an unfair assessment of the several other 
'crusading corsairs' ,33 including La Valette himself who in 1564 had 
authorised his nephew's expedition to seize Malvasia (Malmsey)3-1 -
made remarkably daring feats off Alexandria, preying on vessels laden 
with Oriental silk and other precious wares on their way to Mecca. 
In these middle years of the [sixteenth] century [writes BraudeP5], the 
boldest western corsairs were the Knights of Malta, led by La Valette, 
in the years 1554-1555 and by Romegas in about 1560. In 1561, the 
latter captured 300 slaves and several rich cargoes at the mouth of the 
Nile; in 1563, having set out with two galleys, he was seen sailing back 
to Cape Passaro with over 500 slaves, black and white and, heaped on 
to two ships (the rest had been sunk) the cargoes of eight ships he had 
captured. These prizes, the letters add, 'must have been very rich since 
they came from Alexandria'. In 1564, Romegas brought home three 
corchapins laden with oars, tow and munitions for Tripoli in Barbary, 
and a Turkish round ship of 1,300 salme which had left Tripoli for 
Constantinople with a cargo of 113 black slaves. The ship was taken to 
Syracuse, the corchapins to Naples 
All these spectacular episodes, and more chilling ones besides, only 
provided the occasion for the siege. The true causes ran deeper and 
were of much longer standing. The Ottoman plans to gain control ofthe 
central Mediterranean can be traced to the mid-fifteenth century. In the 
first place, the conquest of Hospitaller Rhodes, a strategic gateway to 
the western Mediterranean, was long considered vital to the realisation 
of this policy. It explains the first significant attempt of 1480.36 And so 
does the siege of Otranto that same year. The timing for both sieges 
appeared ripe. On the one hand, Albania had just been conquered, as 
had been almost the entire chain of Aegean islands, large and small?? 
On the other hand, endemic rivalry persisted among the major centres 
of power on the Italian peninsula - Venice, Milan, Naples and the Papal 
States.38 But both campaigns failed. Was Rhodes' and the Italian port-
city's resistance far stronger than Mehemet II's invading force, or was 
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it the sultan's sudden death and the instability and fear of the unknown 
in the succession process that forced the Ottomans to retreat?39 
Forty-two years later Stileyman succeeded where Mehemet had failed. 
In 1522 the knights were driven out and Rhodes turned Ottoman. 
Secondly, Ferdinand the Catholic's extension of the reconquista to a 
number of strategic points (presidios) on the western portion of the 
North Mrican coast - the fortified island of Pefi6n de Velez on North 
Morocco was seized in 1507, Oran in 1509, and Algiers, Bougie, and 
Tripoli, all in 1510 - was in the long term a major force of permanent 
change. Not only did these developments promote the creation of the 
Barbary Regencies, enticing the Ottoman expansionist drive westward; 
they confirmed the great strategic potential of the central Mediterranean 
zone and the wisdom of Habsburg and Ottoman policy to try and gain 
complete mastery of it. The resultant clash between Christianity and 
Islam, which marked the history of the Mediterranean in the long 
sixteenth century, may therefore be attributed to Ferdinand's expulsion 
of the Moors from Granada in 1492 which inspired his ruthless 
realpolitik on the Maghribi coast. 
11 
Much has been written about the siege of Malta, both in its immediate 
aftermath and since.40 Yet it would still be legitimate to ask how 
meaningful this siege is to the history of the Mediterranean. The year 
2015 marks the 450th anniversary of this episode, which the ehlightened 
eighteenth century considered unique and which contemporary 
chroniclers and later historians did not hesitate to call a great event.41 
This is perhaps understandable. To those who lived and witnessed 
directly the excitement of that savage experience with its massive 
loss of life, when thousands were slaughtered in the name of God, the 
term greatness invoked tragic drama, spectacle, heroism, and even the 
extreme of butchery. A similar perception is likely to be also entertained 
by the common man-in-the-street today, whose innocent knowledge of 
the episode was built on what s/he had learned in her/his early days 
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at school or simply through historical novels.42 Interesting, exciting, 
and elegantly written though these may well be as literary works, they 
should be treated as pure fiction. The siege, no doubt, was impressive 
in its various manifestations - as much in the defenders' heroic 
resistance and in its ruthlessness and carnage as it was in the two sides' 
religious fanaticism and firmness of purpose to annihilate the enemy 
of the Faith. Moreover, the material and psychological extent of the 
disaster is acknowledged by the episode's absence from any narrative 
of contemporary Ottoman history. The event remains unaddressed in 
official Ottoman chronicles. Palace chroniclers did not dare, as was their 
traditional practice, record an Ottoman humiliation. Failure to achieve 
an intended purpose had to be erased from the Empire's collective 
memory. The chroniclers' own career, indeed their life, would have 
been at stake.43 
However, one should sound a cautionary note here. With the development 
of historical scholarship, the professional historian is today familiar with 
the long-term perspective. To him the qualifying term (la tongue duree) 
speaks a different dialect, devising a different vision of reality. It goes 
far beyond emotion and coldly poses several questions that help sustain 
a more meaningful dialogue with the past, not solely with the great men 
of the past.44 Over how long a period were the effects of the siege felt? 
To what extent did its impact spread out through the Mediterranean, 
its broader, more immediate, and forcefully determining geophysical 
context, sufficiently to influence the prevailing conditions - by 
halting their development, perhaps by modifying them, or indeed by 
significantly redirecting them? Did the siege really break the advance of 
the Ottoman Empire into the Western Mediterranean? At certain levels, 
as will be shown, the effects remained vividly alive; at others, they soon 
faded out. The Order did succeed, for example, in keeping the Christian 
victory alive in the Hospital's collective memory and that of the Maltese 
as a significant event through its annual liturgical commemoration on 
8 September. It is still observed today on Malta. On the other hand, to 
regard the siege, as some of my undergraduate students have been taught 
to do, as unparalleled and unequalled anywhere else is too fanciful, 
reaching the acme of parochialism, often the bane, unfortunately, of 
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Maltese historiography. Neither is it correct to claim that Hospitaller 
Malta was the first to show that the Ottomans were not invincible after 
all. That had already been spectacularly demonstrated at the siege of 
Vienna thirty-six years earlier, in 1529. 
To consider the siege as marking the beginning of the decline of the 
Ottoman Empire is historically untenable.45 It simply did not mark 
a decisive turning point in its history. It did not bring the Empire's 
expansionist strategies and efforts to an end. It did not mitigate the 
intense fearit had so severely generated throughout Christian Europe by 
one iota.46 Nor did the frenetic pace of shipbuilding and repair activity 
at Galata, Gallipoli, and the other naval arsenals of the Empire slow 
down. Its traditional objectives and its ready access to over-abundant 
timber supplies and manpower continued to sustain its warlike policies 
and to support the construction of new galleys. Islands and coastal 
villages in the western Mediterranean remained as vulnerable to Muslim 
corsair raids as they had been before 1565, providing the Empire with a 
constant flow of slaves. In 1566 the Turkish fleet sailed into the Adriatic 
with some six to seven thousand men, ravaged the towns of Ortona-a-
Mare, San Vito, and Vasto on the coast of Abruzzo, and then set them 
on fire.4? That same year witnessed, too, both Stileyman's massive 
expedition with some 300,000 men to Central Europe (Szigetvar, in 
Hungary) and the capture of Chios from the Genoese. Two years later 
the Ottoman armada sailed in defence of Muslim Sumatra against the 
Portuguese. By May 1570 the conquest ofVenetian Cyprus was nearly 
complete. From Malta to Lepanto, 'the Ottomans still maintained,' 
notes Onur Yildirim,.J8 'their diplomatic relations with the principal 
political powers of their time in terms favourable to enhancing their 
supremacy against their eastern and western neighbours'. Yildirim is 
referring in particular to the truce with Austria and the revised terms of 
peace with Poland in 1568. In the summer of 1573, notwithstanding the 
crushing defeat the Ottomans had experienced at Lepanto, a new fleet, 
constructed within five to six months,49 ravaged the coasts of Sicily and 
southern Italy,50 and at the same time 'subdued' Yemen after years of 
revolt.51 The following year, the Ottomans took Tunis and La Goulette 
permanently from Spain. Fez on Morocco was captured in 1576.52 To 
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these 'astonishing achievements' should be added Murad IV's recapture 
of Baghdad, '22 years after it had been lost in 1617,' Crete in 1669, 
and in 1683 Vienna was besieged again.53 If, by the later half of the 
sixteenth century, 'further expansion of the empire' did in fact begin 
to grind gradually to a halt, betraying early symptoms of decline, it 
may only be attributed to the death of Stileyman in September 15665,( 
and to 'a number of fundamental weaknesses', like 'inflation and 
financial difficulties, rural depopulation, problems with the timariote 
system which had important social and economic consequences, undue 
influence of court favourites and women in the affairs of state.'55 Other 
contributory elements included the sultanate itse1f,56 like Stileyman's 
own 'unworthy successor', Selim H, 'the first of the do-nothing 
sultans' .57 These were more determining factors than the repulsion of 
the huge Ottoman armada at Malta, which 'merely strengthened the 
desire for revenge' .58 
Desmond Seward puts the argument very neatly and succinctly: 'the 
siege had decided nothing, and the Turks completed their conquest of 
the Levant.'59 The 'military threat to the Christian west,' says Henry 
Kamen, 'continued to be very real. '60 That the need was felt to form with 
urgency another Holy League between the papacy, Venice, and Spain 
over the question of Cyprus was further proof of this. Moreover, the 
decline of the Ottoman Empire, like, for example, that of the Republic 
of Venice , was in part a relative phenomenon. The extent of one's power 
is measured by contrasting it with that of its rivals. One's might grows, 
or appears to grow, relatively weaker if that of its rivals is seen to grow 
stronger. If one does not keep up with the enemy's progress, one starts 
falling behind. In its various manifestations, the rise of the nation-state 
in Europe with its accompanying strengths political consolidation, 
military sophistication, steady economic growth, restructure of society, 
and cultural development - was one major element which rendered 
the Ottomans weaker by comparison. The Ottomans failed to progress 
at the same pace as Europe.61 
Within the sphere of Hospitaller history, the far-famed victory of 1565 
was necessary - to revive its morale, regain its self-confidence and 
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sense of direction, recover its prestige, reaffirm its political relevance 
to Christian Europe, and reclaim its traditionally close rapport with 
its patrons. Ironically, it was in the Order's interest to keep the threat 
of Islam alive, as it alone could underscore the Hospital's political 
relevance and sustain its reason for existence. If there was no such 
threat, real or feigned, the Order would have had to create it. 
Within the context of the local history of Malta, the siege had set in 
motion forces which not only modified the island's physical, social, and 
cultural physiognomy: they determined the shape and form its structural 
transformation would assume. As pointed out elsewhere over a decade 
ago,62 the observations David Herlihy made on the Italian city ofPistoia63 
apply perfectly well to the central Mediterranean island - 'changes in 
the size and character of its population, the economic activities of its 
people in town and countryside, governmental institutions, distribution 
of wealth, social divisions, and culture in both its religious and secular 
manifestations' . 
The two distinct historical contexts, the Order's and Malta's, were 
mutually interactive. It was in part the outcome of the siege, but to 
a greater extent (as will be shown later) la Valette's own failure to 
find a better place for his Convent, which retained the Hospitallers 
permanently on Malta.6-l In the long term, the regular flow of funds 
from their vast estates in Europe, channelled and invested on the island, 
the knights' own lavish standard and style of living, their consistent 
crusading activities, their wide network of diplomatic representations 
throughout Europe, their consular agencies set up in almost every port 
city in the Mediterranean, their aspirations of grandeur and claim to 
sovereignty - all these collectively helped to transform Malta radically 
for the better. By the time the French Revolution broke out in 1789 the 
island which the eight-man commission had visited and reported upon 
so negatively in 1524 was no longer recognisable. On the other hand, 
Malta too contributed its small, but significant, share to the Hospital. 
It helped the Hospitallers 'to survive' as an institution and to retain, by 
and large, unlike all the other military orders, its original character.65 
Secondly, Malta, with its 'relatively isolated, self-contained and easily 
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controllable environment', helped to enhance the Hospital's 'devotional 
side' .66 Thirdly, the island 'also gave the Order sovereignty' .67 This 
multifaceted interaction between the two phenomena, Malta and the 
Hospital, may only be attributed to the outcome of the siege of 1565. 
There is one other issue worth reflecting on - the controversial figure 
of Jean de la Valette, as he is more popularly known. No controversy 
surrounds his heroic performance, first, in the whole tragic drama, in 
forcefully leading his knightly team and Maltese subjects to withstand 
the Turkish assault, and, secondly, immediately after the siege, in 
building the new fortress-city in all its Renaissance splendour, majesty, 
and elegance.68 He died in 1568. His dominating physical stature, his 
overwhelming personality combining intelligence, religious conviction, 
and military discipline, elicited fear, reverence, and reassurance. He 
could not fail to leave a lasting impression on whoever came in his 
presence. His image has barely changed since then. A closer look at the 
true man, not at Antoine de Favray's artistic representation on canvas, 
where he is depicted as a demigod, but at the pen-portrait extant in 
surviving archival documentation, provides a better understanding of 
one of the most outstanding masters of the Order of St John. It reveals 
an underlying reality which historians had for long inexplicably tended 
to ignore - the Hospitaller warrior's attitude towards his principality, 
the negative perception he consistently entertained of Malta's potential. 
This is where controversy lies. He was a mortal like everyone else. 
He detested the island's weaknesses and the stark limitations its size 
inevitably imposed on the Order, too physically small and restricted to 
meet his grandiose ambitions. The person who is generally acclaimed 
as one of the island's greatest heroes, to whom a majestic bronze 
monument has fairly recently been erected in the heart of Valletta, did 
all he could within his powers to transfer his Convent to a better place. 
His appeal to the general-chapter in 1548 to move the Hospitaller 
headquarters to Tripoli is one classic example. There were others, in 
1559 and 1567.69 
To conclude: it has often been claimed that the knights defended the 
Christian cause with dedication and great determination.70 However, 
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in the Ottoman siege of Malta, what really lay at stake was not the 
Christian cause. In the late fifteenth century, Venice had lost a whole 
string of important islands and other strategic posts, like Lepanto on the 
Gulf of Corinth, Modon, Coron, and Navarino, and yet Christendom 
remained intact. Rhodes was lost in 1522, with the leading Christian 
powers (the Habsburgs and the Valois) taking barely any notice, 
totally absorbed in making political and territorial gains on the Italian 
peninsula. Yet Christian Europe survived unharmed, as it would again 
and again after the fall of Cyprus in 1570, the loss of Tunis four years 
later, of Crete in 1669,71 and of the Morea late in the second decade of 
the eighteenth century.72 So, if one strips these and similar events of 
all their political rhetoric, what really was at stake in 1565 could not 
have been the Christian cause. Nor could it have been Malta's. If the 
island surrendered, most of its inhabitants would have probably been 
put to the sword or enslaved; those spared the ordeal would have either 
had to await being ransomed or experience a radical cultural change, a 
process of Islamisation like that of other Christian islands captured by 
the Turks or Barbary corsairs. For two centuries from AD 870, Malta 
had experienced Muslim rule,73 without disappearing from the map 
of the Mediterranean. Was not Hospitaller Malta, after all, the great-
grandchild of Muslim Malta? In the siege, what lay quintessentially at 
risk of total extinction was the Hospitaller institution. On this occasion, 
it was definitely not a question of the conventual headquarters being 
brutally forced to migrate to another location. It was literally a pure 
struggle for survival. La Valette and his knights knew very well that, 
if Malta capitulated to the Turkish forces, not only was there nowhere 
else to go, they could not expect to be treated the same way they had 
been on leaving Rhodes. The loss of Malta would have annihilated the 
Hospital completely. 
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